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Is there a sound democratic case for raising the membership  
of young people in political parties and trade unions through 
descriptive representation?
by Thomas Tozer
portant political implications. There are certain groups the un-
der-representation of which would raise concerns about whether 
the group’s voice is being heard in the representative assembly, and 
its views and interests adequately represented; i.e. which would 
have implications for representative democracy.
Young people are such a group. Data from two European surveys, 
from the late 1980s to 2000s, reveal a gap between the age of 
party members and of the general population that has been pres-
ent for a long time, but which has grown larger in recent decades 
(Scarrow/Gezgor 2010: 829f.). A general tendency for member-
ship of political parties to decline has been present across most 
European countries, but it has hit the young – who are often the 
first to express frustration with the political system – especially 
hard (Bruter/Harrison 2009: 1260f.). Consider the UK, for ex-
ample. Among the UK’s main political parties, only a very small 
percentage of members are less than 25 years old: in 1990, the 
percentage ranged from 1% of the Conservatives to 12% of the 
Green Party (Davis 1990: 101). More recent figures on the mem-
bership of British political parties, according to a recent study, 
are no less alarming: though 18-24 year-olds make up about one-
tenth of the population, they make up just one-twentieth of the 
membership base of the four biggest political parties – Conserva-
tives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and the SNP – varying between 
4% of Labour’s membership base and 6% of the Liberal Democrats’. 
This age-group, in comparison to others, makes up by far the 
smallest proportion these parties’ members. In contrast, over-65s 
make up about 18% of the UK population but comprise 44% 
of Conservative members and around 30% of the other parties’ 
membership bases. As the authors of the study write: “None of 
the parties…has got that much to write home about when it 
comes to young people.” (Bale et al. 2018: 8f.)
Similarly, while union membership has been in significant de-
cline over the past three decades (The Economist 2015), it has 
declined disproportionately among the young and now stands at 
a particularly low level for this group.1 For example, in the UK in 
autumn 2000, union membership stood at 10% of 16-24 year-
old workers, compared with 30% of workers aged 25-65. Figures 
from 1983 show that this gap has widened: back then, the rate in 
Britain was 34% within the first group and 54% within the sec-
ond. In 1975 the respective figures were 43% and 58% (Blanden/
Machin 2003: 393). In 2015 just 9% of workers aged 16-24 were 
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Introduction
Membership of a political party or a trade union bestows a form 
of power upon the member, giving her an opportunity to influ-
ence politics. Indeed, members often exert significant influence 
on the party. Depending on its rules, members might select or 
help to select the party’s candidates or leaders. They may present 
new suggestions for policy, as well as sharing views which reflect 
those of the electorate – an oft-cited benefit of membership for 
the party is that it will gain from policy ideas which mirror the 
needs and wishes of the electorate, with the members acting like 
scouts for these (Kölln/Polk 2017: 20). Finally, party membership 
 is often a requirement for standing for a party position, and thus 
for gaining political office: future politicians will arise from the re-
spective membership bases of parties. Similarly, by joining a trade 
union – an organisation of workers who have come together to 
protect and improve their employment conditions – it becomes 
possible to affect its agenda and priorities, suggest new ideas, 
bring the views of the electorate to bear on its policies, and so 
forth. In particular, membership of a trade union allows the mem-
ber to influence her own and others’ working conditions, such as 
their wages, pensions and holiday allowance, by influencing what 
the trade union itself is seeking, and how it intends to obtain it. 
Moreover, political parties parties function as a link between the 
electorate and the government, safeguarding the legitimacy of 
the latter by ensuring that it is responsive to the concerns of the 
former (Keman 2014; see also Dalton et al. 2011; Müller/Katz 
1997). Trade unions, on the other hand, function to look after 
the interests of workers, and to protect them from exploitation or 
maltreatment at the hands of their employer.
It is therefore obvious that the extent to which different groups 
are represented in political parties and trade unions will have im-
A
There are certain groups the under-representation of 
which would raise concerns about whether the group’s 
voice is being heard in the representative assembly, and 
its views and interests adequately represented.
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members of a union, compared with 20% of those aged 25-34 and 
33% of those aged 50 or over (Full Fact 2017).
This essay asks whether the under-representation of young people 
in political parties and trade unions poses a democratic problem 
and, if so, how it should be addressed. It begins by examining the 
requirements of democracy and considering whether descriptive 
representation, which requires that representatives are from the 
descriptive or “group” that they represent, would support these 
requirements. I argue that although descriptive representation en-
tails democratic costs, there is a contingent (or “contextual”) case 
for descriptive or “group” representation that is consistent with 
the aims of democracy. Young people, moreover, satisfy this case; 
and the case also holds for membership of political parties and 
trade unions. The essay concludes by considering what actions are 
thereby required by democracy in order to boost the membership 
of young people in political parties and trade unions.
What is required by democracy?
Democracy was defined by Rousseau (2008 [1762]: 67) as the 
political form that arises when the whole, or the majority, of gov-
ernment power is bestowed upon the people. In a similar vein, 
Phillips (1995: 27-30) distinguishes two principles of democracy: 
popular control and popular equality. The first requires that it is 
“the people” who control politics; government must not only be 
“for the people” but also “by the people”. The second requires that 
every citizen must have an equal level of power to determine po-
litical outcomes, as expressed by the old dictum “one person, one 
vote”; the days of John Stuart Mill’s proposals of multiple votes 
for the more educated are long gone. Equality, therefore, is the 
basis of a democratic division of power (Brown 1950: 47). “No 
system”, Phillips (1995: 27) writes, “can claim to be democratic 
if it does not recognize the legitimacy of these two goals”. The 
two principles can in fact be collapsed into one: political power 
– i.e. the ability to make political decisions – must be held by all 
citizens in equal measure. This is the most fundamental principle 
of democracy.
Yet in that raw form, this principle leaves open an important 
question: should democracy be concerned only that the formal 
institutions and systems of democracy bestow equal political pow-
er upon all citizens, or should it be concerned with the distribu-
tion of political power more generally? The two prongs of this 
question correspond to two conceptions of democracy, as distin-
guished by Dworkin (1987: 3-8): a dependent conception, and 
a detached conception.2 According to the first, the consequences 
of political institutions and processes for the substantive equality 
of citizens must be considered at the same time as questions of 
whether the institutions and processes themselves distribute pow-
er equally. The best form of democracy is one that is as well-placed 
as possible to produce decisions which treat all citizens as equally 
important. According to the second, all that matters is that there 
is formal equality, i.e. that power over political decisions is distrib-
uted equally – the institutions and processes of democracy give 
every citizen an equal stake in decision-making. The results of 
these decisions are irrelevant.
As Dworkin explains, the dependent conception regards the best 
form of democracy as determined by an “output test”: it favours 
whatever form is “most conducive to advancing or protecting 
these substantive egalitarian goals…[and] is most likely to pro-
duce the substantive decisions and results that treat all members of 
the community with equal concern”; it regards the consequences 
of these decisions as crucial. The detached conception, on the oth-
er hand, regards the best form of democracy as determined by an 
“input test”: if forced to decide between different democratic pro-
cesses, it favours whichever “is best calculated to improve equality 
of political power still further”, but ignores the consequences of 
these processes or of the decisions made by them (Dworkin 1987: 
3-5).
The normal presumption is in favour of the detached conception: 
equal voting power among citizens, and hence majority rule, is 
commonly held as the fundamental principle of democracy; any-
thing that counts against it (and against majority rule) is consid-
ered anti-democratic. The “apparent neutrality” (Dworkin 1987: 
7) [my emphasis] of this conception of democracy also makes it 
particularly appealing. But, of course, this neutrality does not 
ensure neutrality of outcome. If, for example, voters hold some 
preferences that are based on sexist or racist sentiments, then the 
“neutral” apparatus of democracy will simply mirror these prefer-
ences in the composition of its representatives.
Though there is not space here to treat the tension between these 
two conceptions of democracy with the thoroughness it deserves, 
and that it receives from Dworkin, let me offer a brief argument 
in favour of the dependent conception. Narrowly following a nor-
mative principle is folly if doing so will lead to an outcome that 
undermines that principle’s aims, i.e. that undermines the deeper 
principle(s) underlying that principle. Thus it would be folly, for 
example, to follow the principle “you should feed your children 
meat” in order to fulfil the principle “you should ensure that your 
children are healthy”, if we knew that for some reason the meat we 
were feeding our children would actually make them unhealthy.
Consider the democratic principle that political institutions must 
distribute political decision-making power equally. This principle 
is followed, I suggest, because it is believed to be the best way to 
ensure that everyone has an equal stake in the political process 
(for example, by having one vote each), rather than some peo-
ple having more political decision-making power than others. In 
other words, it is followed on the basis that it is the best way to 
ensure political power is held equally by all citizens. What this 
implies is that the principle “political institutions must distribute 
political power equally” is underpinned by the (deeper) principle 
that political power must be held equally by all citizens: that is the 
more fundamental principle of democracy. It is that latter prin-
ciple which motivates the former one. But if this is the case, then 
it would make no sense to follow the former while neglecting the 
latter. Rather, the latter must take precedence. If a tension arises 
between the two principles, we must prioritise the deeper princi-
This essay asks whether the under-representation 
of young people in political parties and trade unions 
poses a democratic problem and, if so, how it should be 
addressed.
Narrowly following a normative principle is folly if doing 
so will lead to an outcome that undermines that prin-
ciple’s aims, i.e that undermines the deeper principle(s) 
underlying that principle.
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ple that political power must be held equally by all citizens. Since 
this motivating principle is the guiding principle of the dependent 
conception, and the motivated principle – that political institu-
tions must bestow equal political decision-making power on all 
citizens – is the guiding principle of the detached conception, it 
therefore follows that we should favour the dependent conception 
over the detached conception. Thus, we should adhere to a princi-
ple of substantive equality (i.e. actual equality of political power), 
rather than merely formal equality.
Democracy is also endorsed as a good method for promoting peo-
ple’s substantive interests – such as in peace, prosperity and liberty 
(Kolodny 2014: 199-202).3 In short, the idea is that by giving peo-
ple ownership of political decision-making, democratic political de-
cisions (as opposed to non-democratic decisions) are more likely to 
be the ones that will best further people’s substantive interests. Per-
haps furthering people’s substantive interests could not be consid-
ered a requirement of democracy as such, but rather an (absolutely 
fundamental) aim of democracy. A democracy that successfully 
promoted prosperity would mutatis mutandis be considered a “bet-
ter democracy” than one that did not, but it would probably not 
thereby be considered any more democratic. But this distinction is 
not especially relevant here: for our purposes, we can add “further-
ing people’s substantive interests” to the requirements of democracy.
In conclusion, then, democracy is required for two things: to pro-
mote substantive equality, and to promote people’s substantive 
interests.
Democracy vs descriptive representation
The specific form of representation relevant to our purposes is 
descriptive or mirror representation. This form of representation 
requires that the representative shares some of the essential char-
acteristics of the group that she represents, such as shared experi-
ences and/or physical identity. Thus, women should be represent-
ed by women, blacks by blacks, the working class by the working 
class, and so forth.4 The ideal of descriptive representation, coined 
“microcosmic representation” by Birch (1971: 17; 1975: 56), is 
that the representative assembly should reflect, in exact propor-
tions, the socio-demographic divisions within society – it should 
be the entire citzenry in microcosm.
Arguments for descriptive representation have carried considerable 
weight over the past few centuries. In the American revolution-
ary period, John Adams argued that the representative assembly 
should be “an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large”, 
and the seminal 19th-century utilitarians Jeremy Bentham, James 
Mill and John Stuart Mill all espoused an essentially microcosmic 
conception of representation (Adams 1856; Judge 1999: 23-30; 
Birch 1971: 53-55). 
Descriptive representation and the methods to achieve it, such as 
quotas, are often taken to conflict with democratic ideals however, 
such as the principle that every citizen should have an equal op-
portunity to run for office. This conflict is crucial for us to resolve, 
because if descriptive representation necessarily contradicts the 
principles of democracy then there cannot be a democratic case for 
descriptive representation of young people in political parties and 
trade unions. My answer: although descriptive representation may 
contradict some democratic principles, the conception of democ-
racy sketched above means that a democratic case for descriptive 
representation will stand so long as the overall effect of descriptive 
representation is to further substantive equality and promote peo-
ple’s substantive interests. When would we expect it to do so?
There are numerous possible cases. Although the members of a 
particular group in society may be politically marginalised or have 
interests that can only be addressed through policy (both of which 
could potentially be addressed through descriptive representation), 
they might also not be represented because, for example, they lack 
the confidence to stand for office; or they may be ill-informed 
about how to stand for office; or they may not have the educational 
attainments necessary to persuade people to vote for them. In such 
cases, descriptive representation might, overall, function effectively 
to promote substantive equality and substantive interests.
Perhaps the most commonly discussed case however, which ar-
guably entails some (or even all) of these, is when there is an un-
equal structure of power within society that effectively prevents 
a particular group standing for office. Very often, this structure 
of power is invisible, potentially creating a “glass ceiling” for the 
group. As a result of this unequal power structure, the group does 
not receive the political support it needs and deserves, even though 
the political institutions may bestow on them the same level of 
political power (i.e. one person, one vote; the right of every in-
dividual to run for office; etc.) as on everyone else in society. For 
example, if the members of a minority group are regarded by most 
to be “second-class citizens” due to an underlying racism in soci-
ety, and if they are poorer and less well educated than the rest of 
society, then formal equality will not be enough for them: invis-
ible  barriers to running for office, such as lacking the knowledge 
of how to stand for office, and invisible barriers to being voted 
in, such as the racist preferences of most of the electorate, will 
mean that the equal political power bestowed on them by the 
political institutions will not translate into equal political power 
more generally.
This is especially true in cases of intersectionality: when someone be-
longs to more than one marginalised group. For example, if homo- 
sexuals and white people were marginalised, then white homo - 
sexuals would suffer from the dual effects of these two unequal pow-
er structures. They may experience a unique form of marginalisa tion 
that is different from the sum of the marginalisation experienced 
by whites and homosexuals. If particularly bad, this group (white 
 homosexuals) might therefore merit  descriptive representation.
The extent to which different groups will have a case for descrip-
tive representation is contingent, however: it will depend upon 
the particular groups and the political context in question. Broad-
ly speaking, the case for the descriptive representation of a group 
will hinge on whether such representation will further substantive 
equality and substantive interests. But that leaves us with a tricky 
question: when would it do so? Answering that is the task of the 
next section.
The equal political power bestowed on them by the 
 political institutions will not translate into equal poli-
tical power more generally.
Thus, we should adhere to a principle of substantive 
equality, rather than merely formal equality.
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Which groups?
There are innumerable groups in society that could be candidates 
for descriptive representation: gingers, Protestants, blacks, homo-
sexuals, women, gypsies, left-handers, cyclists, disabled people, fat 
people, young people, etc. The difficulty in determining precisely 
which groups require descriptive presentation and why is often 
taken to be a very serious issue for descriptive representation – or 
even to be dispositive (Mansbridge 1999: 634). But it is not insur-
mountable. There are clearly principles to be uncovered regarding 
which groups should be represented, because it is immediately 
obvious that while there would be a good case for the descriptive 
representation of some of these groups, such as women, for oth-
ers, such as gingers, there would not.
Young (1990: 186f.) argues that we should represent oppressed 
social groups, not interest groups or ideological groups. “Once 
we are clear that the principle of group representation refers 
only to oppressed social groups,” she writes, “then the fear of an 
unworkable proliferation of group representation should dissi-
pate.”
Beyond this, however, Young does not offer any philosophical 
criteria by which it could be determined precisely which groups 
should be represented, claiming rather that no philosophical ar-
gument could resolve this problem and so the application of her 
normative principle should be rough and ready. Ultimately, she 
claims, it should depend upon the context: any principle that is 
devised should be subject to revision if conditions change (Young 
1990: 190). For example, the Catholic/Protestant cleavage was 
so salient that it required political representation in the 19th and 
early 20th century. Now that cleavage has faded, but new groups 
have emerged with their own particular cases for descriptive rep-
resentation (Young 1998).
Not only is Iris M. Young's account fuzzy on the details, howev-
er, her list of “oppressed groups” (1989: 261) in the US includes 
about 80% of the population! As Kymlicka (1995: 145) points 
out, that puts into serious doubt Young’s claim that her concep-
tion avoids an “unworkable proliferation” of different groups re-
quiring descriptive representation. 
Mansbridge takes a more direct approach. “The primary function 
of representative democracy,” she suggests, “is to represent the 
substantive interests of the represented through both deliberation 
and aggregation [voting]” (Mansbridge 1999: 630). Thus, the 
case for descriptive representation should be judged against this 
criterion; and it is democracy’s deliberative function that requires 
descriptive representation far more than its aggregative function 
(Mansbridge 1999: 629). 
Mansbridge’s conclusion is that there are two contexts in which 
descriptive representation will so improve deliberation: when a 
disadvantaged group mistrusts society, and when the expression 
of a group’s interests and views is uncrystallised, descriptive rep-
resentation will improve communication and add experiential 
knowledge. There are also two contexts in which descriptive rep-
resentation will further goals unrelated to representation (i.e. un-
related to either deliberation or aggregation): when a group has 
historically been politically subordinate, descriptive representa-
tion creates a social meaning of “ability to rule”; and when a group 
has historically been discriminated against, descriptive representa-
tion will increase the group’s attachment to the policy, and thus 
improve their perception of its legitimacy (Mansbridge 1999). 
Since we are assuming a dependent conception of democracy, these 
two contexts must also be considered legitimate cases for descrip-
tive representation.
Yet Mansbridge’s view strikes me as being overly complex while 
at the same time giving an insufficient account of which groups 
should be represented and why. There are surely cases outside of 
Mansbridge’s four that would justify descriptive representation. 
For example, what about a group whose concerns have historically 
been misinterpreted? Mansbridge’s criteria also fail to get to the 
heart of why certain groups merit descriptive representation. Her 
four cases, though related, are distinct in a way that leaves the 
reader wondering exactly what they have in common. Certainly 
she goes some way towards explaining this – the first two will 
both improve deliberation, for example – but at the same time, 
a deeper question remains unanswered: why should we be con-
cerned with improving deliberation only with respect to the needs 
of these particular groups?
Two criteria
There are, I suggest, two criteria for representation which under-
pin both Young’s and Mansbridge’s stabs at which groups should 
be represented. This is my own attempt at answering the ques-
tion: the democratic case for descriptive representation holds for 
those groups which have (1) unique concerns that are significant 
(2) where those concerns stand to be affected by the actions of 
the elected representative body. These two conditions are, I con-
tend, jointly necessary and sufficient for a case for descriptive rep-
resentation. 
Numbers alone do not matter. Phillips (1995: 21), for example, 
decries the “injustice” and “democratic deficit” implied by women 
making up just 5% of the legislature, and claims that in such a 
context the case for descriptive representation, which Phillips calls 
the “politics of presence”, appears beyond question. But in fact, 
the under-representation of a social group to this extent is not, by 
itself, sufficient for concern. For example, imagine that just 5% of 
the legislature can roll their tongue, even though tongue-rollers 
comprise 50% of the population – this would be the same ratio of 
percentage presence in the population to percentage presence in 
parliament (50:5) as in the case of women, but it would not be of 
concern. Why? The reason, I suggest, is that tongue-rollers do not 
meet either of the two criteria. They have no significant unique 
concerns, and, even if they did, there is nothing much that poli-
tics could do about them – there is no drug that can alter whether 
or not someone is able to roll their tongue that the state could 
sponsor. Women, on the other hand, clearly meet both: they have 
significant unique concerns – for example on particular issues 
such as maternity leave and abortion – and these concerns stand 
to be affected by political action – for example, legislation could 
There are innumerable groups in society that could 
be candidates for descriptive representation: gingers, 
Protestants, blacks, homosexuals, women, gypsies, 
left-handers, cyclists, disabled people, fat people, young 
people, etc.
A deeper question remains unanswered: why should 
we be concerned with improving deliberation only with 
respect to the needs of these particular groups?
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determine how much maternity leave businesses are required to 
give women, or it could change the legal status of abortion.
The wording “stand to be affected by” of the second criterion is 
important. To justify descriptive representation, it does not have 
to be the case that the concerns of the group will necessarily benefit 
from political action, as such. Indeed, for an issue such as abortion 
it is not clear what it would mean for women to benefit from po-
litical action, because the correct policy on abortion is something 
that is hotly disputed among women. The point is rather that be-
cause such an issue will be significantly affected by politics, and 
because women stand to be uniquely affected by it, women should 
be able to stand in the political assembly and represent their unique 
concerns on the issue. This is necessary in order that the substan-
tive equality of men and women, and the substantive interests of 
 society, are supported – i.e. that the aims of democracy are fulfilled.
Indeed, as Phillips argues, women may have diverse opinions on 
childcare and abortion, but this does not render these issues gen-
der-neutral (1995: 67-71). On the contrary, they are issues that 
are profoundly more relevant to women than to men, and the 
argument for the “presence” of women in parliament does not 
depend on all women sharing the same viewpoint, but only on 
the fact that the interests of women and men are distinct. I should 
also add that it is not necessary for the group itself to express the 
concern(s) of criterion (1). Consider Mansbridge’s case of a group 
that mistrusts the polity, for example: such a group thereby has 
a unique, and significant, concern (its level of trust in the poli-
ty), but it may not itself recognise this mistrust as a “concern”. 
Finally, let me add that the term “unique concerns” should have 
some degree of stretch: if there are significant concerns that affect 
a  particular group more than any other group, then that group 
meets the first criterion pro tanto.
Thus, when Mansbridge and Young propose theoretical categories 
for determining which particular groups should be represented, 
these categories are in fact merely examples of groups that tick 
both these boxes. Take “groups who have uncrystallised interests”: 
if such a group did not have any unique concerns, then its lack of 
clarity on these issues would not be democratically problematic 
because the policies that others would prefer are just as likely to 
fit the preferences of this group as any other group; and if they 
had unique concerns but these did not stand to be affected by the 
actions of the political assembly, then there would be no point in 
worrying about their political representation.
My argument for why we should reduce the case for groups re-
quiring descriptive representation to these two criteria is two-fold. 
First, the attempts to answer “which groups should be descriptive-
ly represented?” by Mansbridge and Young seem to be accounted 
for by these two criteria; and the two criteria themselves are both 
simpler and more concise than the proposals of either Mansbridge 
or Young. 
Second, more fundamentally, these two criteria follow logically 
from an appreciation of the very purpose of descriptive representa-
tion, as I have presented it in this essay: to promote substantive 
equality, and to further democracy’s ability to promote people’s 
substantive interests. Descriptive representation of the groups that 
meet my two criteria will ensure that decision-making power is 
held by all relevant groups which are: the groups which actually 
have important “group concerns” to be represented (determined 
by criterion one – i.e. by the fact that the group actually has con-
cerns which are unique to it and which are important enough to 
merit representation), given that political representation of these 
concerns would be worthwhile (determined by criterion two – i.e. 
by the fact that would be no point in giving a group political rep-
resentation if doing so could not have any impact on that group’s 
concerns). Thus, by preventing political neglect of all the relevant 
groups, the two criteria will further substantive equality (the first 
requirement of democracy, as I have laid it out); and by ensuring 
that the relevant groups are given a voice in the representative 
assembly, the two criteria will increase the likelihood that policy 
decisions will be made which further their substantive interests 
(the second requirement of democracy). The two criteria them-
selves simply determine what the “relevant” groups are.
It is worth noting, moreover, that the case for descriptive rep-
resentation sketched above, about how descriptive representation 
may be necessary in order to tackle an unequal power structure in 
society, is accounted for by the two criteria, because a group that 
is uniquely suffering from an unequal power structure is precisely 
the sort of group that would meet the criteria.
To the extent that a certain group fulfils the criteria, the case for 
descriptive representation of that group is, I contend, pro tan-
to strong. For example, if the group’s concerns are completely 
unique to that group, very important, and stand to be affected 
significantly by political action, then that group has a very strong 
case for descriptive representation. Thus, like Mansbridge and 
Young, I propose a contingent (or “contextual”) case for descriptive 
representation that will vary according to the conditions of the 
time and to the group under consideration. Hence, to return to 
our original question, whether the underrepresentation of young 
people in political parties and trade unions is a democratic prob-
lem depends on whether, and to what extent, they meet these two 
criteria.5
Let me close this section by giving an example of descriptive rep-
resentation that clearly met these two criteria and which, hence, 
has succeeded in furthering both substantive equality and peo-
ple’s substantive interests: the representation of women in South 
Africa. As detailed above, women clearly meet both criteria very 
strongly. And the increased representation of women in South Af-
rica has led to significant legislative amendments and additions 
on issues such as abortion and employment equality, and can even 
The democratic case for descriptive representation holds 
for those groups which have (1) unique concerns that are 
significant (2) where those concerns stand to be affected 
by the actions of the elected representative body.
These two criteria follow logically from an appreciation 
of the very purpose of descriptive representation… 
to promote substantive equality, and to further democ-
racy’s ability to promote people’s substantive interests.
Hence, to return to our original question, whether the 
underrepresentation of young people in political parties 
and trade unions is a democratic problem depends 
on whether, and to what extent, they meet these two 
criteria.
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be credited with the 1998 Domestic Violence Bill (Devlin/Elgie 
2008: 240). It is self-evident that such legislative effects will fur-
ther substantive equality and substantive interests.
More generally, although the impact in African countries of great-
er female presence in parliament has been to some extent mixed, 
in large part the less successful cases have been due to factors that 
prevent successful descriptive representation, such as women rep-
resentatives feeling that they must toe the party line, rather than 
the ineffectiveness of descriptive representation itself (Devlin/ 
Elgie 2008: 240) (I respond to a related worry below: “Discourag-
ing ‘we-thinking’ and harming deliberation”).
Objections
Before we consider whether young people meet the two criteria, 
there are a number of strong and popular objections to descriptive 
representation that I should consider, some of which are directly 
concerned with its impact on democracy.
Accountability
Accountability is an essential piece of apparatus in any system of 
representative democracy, because it is accountability – the pos-
sibility of being held to account at the ballot box – which keeps 
representatives responsive to the people they represent. Therefore, 
if descriptive representation damages accountability, this would 
be a serious democratic issue. Why would it do so? Mansbridge 
(1999: 640) puts the problem very clearly: “The descriptive char-
acteristics of a representative can lull voters into thinking their 
substantive interests are being represented even when this is not 
the case”. She quotes a black representative speaking to Carol 
Swain: “One of the advantages, and disadvantages, of represent-
ing blacks is their shameless loyalty to their incumbents. You can 
almost get away with raping babies and be forgiven. You don’t 
have any vigilance about your performance” (Swain 1993: 73, 
 cited in Mansbridge 1999: 640). 
However, this problem can be reduced if more descriptive repre-
sentatives compete for the post, and are seen within the assembly, 
enabling voters to weigh the virtues of different potential descrip-
tive representatives against each other (Mansbridge 1999: 640f.). 
For example, the fact that some African American groups, such as 
the Congressional Black Caucus, did not endorse Clarence Thom-
as’s nomination to the Supreme Court in 1991, despite his de-
scriptive identity, was an indication that black representatives had 
become sufficiently commonplace that the black community no 
longer felt that they needed to support black candidates no mat-
ter what (Mansbridge 1999: 640f.; Swain 1992). Indeed, so long 
as there are even just two candidates standing for the same posi-
tion we would expect voters to compare them, and for these two 
candidates to therefore compete over who will best represent the 
concerns of the group being represented. The conclusion, then, is 
that in order to avoid a loss of accountability there must be at least 
two descriptive candidates standing for a particular position in the 
representative assembly. From this perspective, the more the better.
Discouraging “we-thinking” and harming deliberation
An essential part of a functioning democracy is deliberation. Suc-
cessful deliberation involves the deliberators being prepared to 
alter their preferences as they reflect on the different points of 
view under discussion, and this in turn depends on “we-thinking” 
rather than “I-thinking”. If deliberators think in this way then 
solutions which were impossible before become possible; and 
without it, individualism can dominate, as a result of which no 
shared vision of the political community is possible (Mansbridge 
1992: 36f.; Elshtain 1981: 246). 
The worry is that descriptive representation encourages represent-
atives to argue for the policies that are best for their group, rather 
than to reflect honestly on the policies that are best, and fairest, for 
society as a whole. This worry is exacerbated by claims that people 
from outside a group cannot, or even should not try, to empathise 
with the needs of, and represent, that group. For example, Baines 
(1992: 56, cited in Kymlicka 1993: 67), making the case for the 
descriptive representation of women, claims that representation 
can occur fully only when the representative shares the identity 
of the represented group: she rejects the notion that a man can, 
or should try to, represent the interests of a woman. Similarly, 
Phillips (1995: 76) contends that “no amount of thought or sym-
pathy, no matter how careful or honest, can jump the barriers 
of experience”. Arguments such as Baines’s and Phillips’s, which 
often underpin arguments for descriptive representation, can dis-
courage people from even attempting to empathise with members 
of other groups by suggesting that such empathy is impossible.
In contrast, by pursuing a shared conception of the common 
good without being directly held to the views and concerns of 
any particular group, in a context that respects the basic norms of 
equity and the democratic process, effective deliberation becomes 
absolutely possible (Phillips 1995: 155-160; Parkinson 2004: 
380f.; Cohen/Rogers 1992: 420). Descriptive representation can 
therefore be seen as an impediment to democratic deliberation.
The first thing to note here is that the above argument for why 
descriptive representation threatens accountability, and this argu-
ment for why it causes representatives to be fixed to the views of 
their group, point in opposite directions. The concern must either 
be that descriptive representation will lead the representative to 
do what he wants and ignore the needs and views of his group, or 
that it will lead the representative’s opinions to be fixed to these in 
a way that will harm deliberation. It cannot cut both ways. 
This itself shows that these two objections to descriptive rep-
resentation are based on shaky ground. For each, the likelihood of 
being true counts against the likelihood of the other being true. 
The sensible conclusion, therefore, seems to be that neither is in-
evitable, nor even especially likely. With respect to the worry that 
deliberation will be harmed, my answer is simply that descriptive 
representatives should be encouraged to bring the concerns and 
views of their group to the debate, but to nonetheless prioritise 
the common good – reaching a set of policies that treat everyone 
as equals – above the welfare of that group alone. This would al-
low representatives the autonomy to deliberate successfully, while 
ensuring that the concerns of their group are taken into account.6 
The objection that representatives would be unable to empathise 
If descriptive representation damages accountability, 
this would be a serious democratic issue.
The worry is that descriptive representation encourages 
representatives to argue for the policies that are best for 
their group, rather than to reflect honestly on the poli-
cies that are best, and fairest, for society as a whole.
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with the concerns of those not from their group strikes me as both 
false and harmful: as Kymlicka (1995: 140) argues, to the extent 
that there are limits to our ability to empathise with other groups, 
we should try to fight against those limitations – not blithely ac-
cept them.
Thus, although there is a danger that descriptive representation 
might cause a loss of accountability or harm deliberation, it seems 
just as likely that it may do no such thing; and by encouraging 
representatives to act in the way just suggested, both pitfalls can 
be avoided.
Selection by lot and loss of talent
Another problem is the practical question of how the goals of 
descriptive representation could be achieved. Actual microcos-
mic representation, for which the proportions in which different 
socio-demographic groups make up the populace is exactly rep-
licated in the representative assembly, would be almost impossi-
ble to achieve unless the representative assembly was chosen by a 
controlled random sample, using selection by lot (as was, in fact, 
practised in ancient Greece), or comprised of volunteers (Birch 
1971: 57f.; Burnheim 1985: 110-113). But as Birch (2001: 97) 
argues, this hardly seems sensible or fair when the job in question 
necessitates particular talents and brings with it a high degree of 
insecurity. 
However, as Mansbridge points out, this criticism holds weight 
only against microcosmic representation – something that few 
contemporary theorists actually defend.7 Microcosmic representa-
tion would indeed entail a huge sacrifice in talent, and it would 
incur the problems mentioned above of abandoning accountabil-
ity since representatives would no longer be authorised by, and 
thereby would not be accountable to, the people they represent 
(Kymlicka 1995: 139). Those are both very strong reasons to re-
ject the case for microcosmic representation. 
Having done so, without having given up the general case for de-
scriptive representation, we are left with what Mansbridge (1999: 
632) calls “selective” descriptive representation, according to which 
“institutional design gives selected groups greater descriptive rep-
resentation than they would achieve in existing electoral systems 
in order to bring the proportions of those groups in the legislature 
closer to their percentages in the population”. This is the type of 
descriptive representation that I am arguing for in this essay. The 
assumption here is that the group is as capable of representing itself 
as any other, and is not suffering from a lack of selection due to any 
factor that relates to how well members of that group could engage 
in political representation, but rather due to some structural factor. 
So the trenchant counter-example to descriptive representation of 
“lunatics representing lunatics” is not relevant here (Mansbridge 
1999: 633).8 Hence there is only a very minimal chance that 
 descriptive representation will lead to a loss in talent.
Quotas
The question remains of how selective descriptive representation 
is to be achieved. Quotas are perhaps the most common way of 
achieving selective descriptive representation. In actual fact, quo-
tas could not be applied to membership in political parties and 
trade unions, for purely practical reasons; but as one of the key 
methods of descriptive representation, they are worth considering 
in order that we can ask what the costs of achieving descriptive 
representation would normally be. At the end of this essay we 
will consider a number of less conventional methods for achiev-
ing selective descriptive representation that would be applicable to 
membership of political parties and trade unions.
The worry is that quotas entail serious democratic costs. In par-
ticular, Rehfeld argues that methods such as quotas, which make 
particular characteristics or beliefs a required qualification for 
people to be able to vote for that person, undermine two pre-
sumptive democratic rights: “the right of citizens to run for any 
office that stands to make and enforce law over them; and the 
right of citizens to choose whomever they want to fill those of-
fices”. And these, Rehfeld contends, are the very principles that 
make representative government a legitimate form of democratic 
self-rule (2009: 239).
Yet given a dependent conception of democracy, quotas can be 
seen as tools that can be justified from a democratic perspective 
even though they incur these democratic costs, so long as their net 
effect is to further the fundamental aims of democracy. The ques-
tion of whether quotas can be justified on democratic grounds 
is therefore contingent: it depends on whether the quota will, in 
the given context, benefit democracy to an extent that outweighs 
these democratic harms.
Essentialism
The final objection to descriptive representation that is considered 
here is essentialism: the worry that descriptive representation re-
lies on a false assumption that groups have an inward “essential” 
nature, and unified views, which could therefore be represented 
by any member of that group.9 This can lead to the sorts of dif-
ficulty which we saw above, in which it is claimed that only the 
members of a group can understand its concerns; or it might lead 
to an essentialising of that group’s concerns, and a consequent 
neglect of the diversity of opinions within that group.
However, there is simply no reason why descriptive representa-
tion has to fall victim to this false assumption. As argued above, 
the case for descriptive representation does not depend upon the 
members of a group all sharing the same view, but only on the fact 
that that group has unique concerns.
Conclusion
If my responses to the above objections have been sound, then 
these objections are not quite as devastating as they first appear. 
Indeed, the only objection that has truly been left standing is Re-
hfeld’s complaint that (in my words) using certain instruments 
of descriptive representation, such as quotas, goes against demo-
cratic principles. It is primarily against this objection, then, that I 
shall later defend my case.
Do young people qualify?
Based on the argument made above, a case for descriptive 
Another problem is the practical question of how the 
goals of descriptive representation could be achieved.
Quotas are perhaps the most common way of achieving 
selective descriptive representation…The worry is that 
quotas entail serious democratic costs.
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 representation of young people will stand if, and only if, they 
meet the two criteria. I will now argue that young people fulfil 
both.
Criterion (1)
Young people, in general, face a number of concerns that are 
specific to them (Howker/Malik: 2013; Martin: 2012; Davis: 
1990). But the current generation of young people, in particular, 
called the “jilted generation” by Howker and Malik, face a num-
ber of especially pressing concerns (Howker/Malik 2013: 202, 
240, 263).10 Indeed, the 20th century saw young people increas-
ingly being singled out as a group that required its own special 
treatment, and it became increasingly commonplace to hear the 
“youth problem” being discussed (Davis 1990).
Let us consider some two specific examples from the UK: student 
debt and housing. With respect to both of these important issues, 
young people have significant, unique concerns. To consider stu-
dent debt first: in 2010, tuition fees were tripled, from £3,000 
to £9,000, by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. In 
England, at the time of writing, they are fixed at £9,250. In 2002 
Margaret Hodge, the higher education minister, justified raising 
tuition fees on the logic that a degree enables a graduate to earn, 
on average, an extra £400,000 over his or her lifetime. Since then, 
this figure has been deployed repeatedly by those who support 
the higher fees. Yet according to more recent research, that figure 
is more like £100,000. According to a study by the Intergenera-
tional Foundation, even this figure is too high; but the study also 
points out that that even if the figure is correct, it cannot cover 
the interest being applied to student loans (Kemp-King 2016). 
As a result of these huge fees, students are now leaving university 
with an average of £50,000 in debt (Belfield et al. 2017). And 
this figure will rise quickly, due to high interest rates. In contrast, 
previous generations enjoyed free university education, without 
having to accrue any debt whatsoever. Thus, young people are 
uniquely faced with the burden of high tuition fees and moun-
tainous student debt.
Young people also face unique, significant concerns in terms 
of housing. Compared to previous generations, they are likely 
to spend longer renting privately and living with their parents 
(Rugg/Quilgars 2015: 5). Indeed, England has seen home-owner-
ship decline among the young for a number of years. In 15 years, 
the proportion of under-35s within the home-owner population 
has dropped by almost half; and the ownership rate of young 
people on low/middle incomes fell from 56% in 1998 to 25% 
in 2013-2014 (Corlett et al. 2016: 36f.). The Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (Cribb et al. 2018) recently released a report that clear-
ly shows the difference in home-owning prospects between the 
young today and previous generations of young people: of 25-34 
year-olds whose incomes were within the middle 20% for their 
age, 65% owned their own home in 1995-96. Yet by 2015-16, it 
was just 27%. This significant drop in house-ownership, which 
can be explained by the rise in house prices over the past few years, 
represents a serious obstacle for young people.
Young people also face pressing democratic concerns. In the UK, 
the likelihood of feeling a civic duty to vote is much lower for 
young people than for the rest of the population. According to 
statistics from 2012, 45% of young people feel a duty to vote; this 
is in contrast to an average of 62% across the population, and a 
level of 73% for those aged 65 and above (Lee/Young 2014). And 
in the UK in 2011-12, 42% of young people aged 16-24 stated 
that they had no interest at all in politics, compared with half this 
figure – 21% – for those aged 65 and above (Randall 2014). Re-
latedly, recent UK elections have seen a significantly lower turn-
out among the young than among older voters. In 2010, 44% of 
18-24 year-olds turned out to vote, compared to 76% of those 
aged 65 and over (Ipsos MORI 2010). In 2015, the correspond-
ing turnout rates were 43% and 78%, and in 2017 they were 
54% and 71% (Ipsos MORI 2015, 2017). Moreover, this ten-
dency seems to have become part of a vicious circle in which the 
young do not vote, vote-seeking politicians therefore ignore their 
concerns, and young people therefore feel ignored and so do not 
vote etc. (Sloam 2007: 565; Birch et al. 2013: 16, 20; Lijphart 
1997: 4; Tozer 2016: 18f.).
It is therefore plain that young people strongly fulfil the first crite-
rion: they have a number of significant, unique concerns. The fact 
that the young also face certain democratic concerns, such as low 
voter turnout, lends particular weight to the democratic case for 
descriptive representation.11
Criterion (2)
These concerns clearly stand to be affected by the actions of the 
elected representative body. With respect to the democratic con-
cerns faced by young people, the vicious circle of young people’s 
under-representation in politics will start to reverse if their rep-
resentation in politics increases: increased political representation 
could trigger a virtuous circle that encourages the representative 
assembly to decide on policies which are fair to young people, 
in turn encouraging more young people to vote. In this way, it 
would help to further substantive equality between the young and 
other age-groups.
More specifically, in terms of the two issues young people face 
that I have just expanded on – student debt and housing – there 
is no doubt that these stand to be affected by political action. It 
was the actions of successive governments that led to tuition fees 
being introduced in the first place and then increasing a number 
of times; and governments have been choosing to continue not to 
change or reverse such policies. That such a reversal is possible is 
demonstrated by the Labour party’s proposed policy of abolishing 
tuition fees entirely. And on housing, there are clearly govern-
ment policies that could improve young people’s prospects. David 
Willetts, formerly a Conservative minister and now chair of the 
Resolution Foundation, a think tank, says: “We do need to accept 
that there’s a very important role for the public sector in getting 
houses built. It can’t all be done by private housebuilders…On 
this, I am completely non-ideological” (quoted in Eaton 2018: 
24).That would remedy a housing shortage, but it also implies a 
Let us consider some two specific examples from the UK: 
student debt and housing. With respect to both of these 
important issues, young people have significant, unique 
concerns.
The fact that the young also face certain democratic 
 concerns, such as low voter turnout, lends parti-
cular weight to the democratic case for descriptive 
 representation.
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prospective solution to the high house prices faced by the young: 
reducing prices by introducing publicly-owned houses at a much 
more affordable price.
Therefore, the second criterion is undoubtedly fulfilled: the young 
face a number of significant unique concerns (including many 
which have not been given here) that stand to be greatly affected 
by political action.
Conclusion
Hence, the case for descriptive representation of young people 
stands. As argued above, the strength of this case depends upon 
the extent to which each of the two criteria is fulfilled. In the 
case of young people, they are both fulfilled strongly: there are 
powerful concerns that are almost completely unique to young 
people, and which stand to be affected very significantly by po-
litical action.
Political parties and trade unions
The next question is whether, and if so to what extent, this dem-
ocratic case for descriptive representation of the young holds 
weight in the context of membership of political parties and trade 
unions. So far, we have been considering the descriptive rep-
resentation of young people in terms of membership of the repre-
sentative assembly, so now we must adjust our case. To do so, we 
have to slightly adjust the second criterion and then see whether 
young people still fit it. (The first criterion does not need to be 
adjusted because it only makes reference to the group itself, and 
so the degree to which it is fulfilled only depends on the character-
istics of this group.) Hence, the question of whether young peo-
ple meet the second criterion becomes: do the significant unique 
concerns of young people stand to be affected by the actions of 
political parties/trade unions?
Let us start with political parties. It has already been established 
that many of the significant, unique concerns of young people 
will be affected by the actions of the political assembly. What 
about the actions of political parties? To some extent, this dichot-
omy is a misnomer: the representative assembly will be comprised 
of members of the ruling political party(s) who has (have) been 
elected to the assembly, and it will implement an agenda that, to 
a greater or lesser extent, was decided by the party’s members.12 
Thus, if the party is in power then its membership base will have 
determined who the country’s political representatives are (since 
being a member of a political party is a prerequisite for standing, 
and hence being elected, as a representative), and, to some degree, 
what policies government is implementing. Therefore, if a polit-
ical party has been voted into power then membership of that 
party implies a very high level of influence. 
Even if the party is not in power, its members will influence it in its 
role as an opposition party. And since opposition parties also have 
a very significant political role – holding the government to ac-
count, offering alternative policy ideas, and so forth – membership 
will still enable significant influence. Therefore, political parties, 
both in and out of power, will be able to considerably affect the 
concerns of young people, and thus promote substantive equality 
and substantive interests. Both criteria are clearly met, and so the 
case for descriptive representation within political parties is strong.
What about trade unions? Trade unions are not concerned with 
people’s conditions in general, but only with their employment 
conditions. Many young people are in full-time education, and 
so would find trade unions to be of little relevance. Furthermore, 
many of the specific issues facing young people (such as student 
debt and housing, as explained above) are issues that which fall 
outside the scope of trade unions. 
At any rate, to the extent that young people are in the work-
force and have certain concerns that are relevant to trade unions, 
most of these concerns (e.g. wage level and employee safety) 
will not be unique to them, but will apply equally to workers 
of all ages – and yet trade unions would not be able to affect 
the concerns that are unique to young people. There will be 
some exceptions – zero-hours contracts might be one – but 
overall, the extent to which young people will have significant, 
unique concerns about employment conditions seems limited. 
Therefore, the degree to which the significant, unique concerns of 
young people can be affected by trade unions (i.e. the second cri-
terion), and hence the case for descriptive representation of young 
people within trade unions, is weak. Descriptive representation 
of young people within trade unions would do little to further 
substantive equality or substantive interests. This conclusion is 
made all the more forceful now that trade unions have reduced 
in power.
The unequal distribution of power within both political parties and 
trade unions, tilted towards older generations, is only of democratic 
concern insofar as the second criterion is met, however. If it were 
not met at all, political parties/trade unions would not have any 
effect on the significant, unique concerns of young people, and so 
the inequality of power would be something of a red herring. It 
would be like there being few chess players on the local council, 
even though most people in the area play chess - this would be an 
inequality of power, but since the local council can't have much 
impact on the problems of the chess world it would not be of dem-
ocratic concern. But it is only political parties that seem likely to 
have much effect on the concerns of young people. The conclusion, 
then, is that it is only within political parties that the inequality of 
power would suggest a strong case for descriptive representation.
Thus, young people, who clearly meet criterion one, meet criteri-
on two strongly in the case of political parties, and weakly in the 
case of trade unions. Hence, there is a strong democratic case for 
descriptive representation of young people within political par-
ties, and only weak case for their descriptive representation within 
trade unions. What, then, should be done? 
It should be noted before we continue that I am asking this ques-
tion in the spirit of political philosophy: I am asking what should 
be done, without worrying at this point whether or not it is done. 
Some trade unions will already be practising some of the sugges-
tions I make below, and to that extent, according to my argument, 
There are powerful concerns that are almost completely 
unique to young people, and which stand to be affected 
very significantly by political action.
The degree to which the significant, unique concerns 
of young people can be affected by trade unions (i.e. 
the second criterion), and hence the case for descriptive 
representation of young people within trade unions, is 
weak.
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they are doing “what should be done” – in the case of other trade 
unions, which are doing no such thing, my argument would im-
ply that they should start following these suggestions. I do not 
attempt an empirical union by union analysis.
Policy I: quotas
Though quotas are a popular tool of descriptive representation, 
they are not practical here. Quotas are inapplicable to the case of 
party or trade union membership simply because people freely 
choose to become members – they are not selected by the party/
trade union in a way that could allow for a requirement that a 
certain proportion of members be from a particular group. How-
ever, because quotas are a popular method for achieving descrip-
tive representation, it is helpful to see whether, if quotas could 
work, they would be democratically appropriate in the case of 
membership of political parties and trade unions. The answer to 
this question can function as a benchmark against which other 
possible policy responses can be assessed.13
To answer whether quotas would be democratically appropriate, 
we must ask another question: would the results of a quota in 
the given context further democracy, by improving substantive 
equality and promoting people’s substantive interests, to an extent 
that would outweigh the quota’s apparent harm to democracy? In 
other words, would a quota have a positive net impact on democ-
racy in this context? 
In the case of trade unions, the answer is “no”: the impact of trade 
unions on the significant, unique concerns of young people would 
be minimal, in comparison to the definite and notable cost to de-
mocracy entailed by quotas. In the case of political parties, howev-
er, the question is much more difficult. As detailed above, political 
parties stand to have a considerable impact on young people’s con-
cerns – but would this impact be considerable enough to outweigh 
the significant democratic costs that quotas would impose? I would 
suggest it would, because the positive  effects that membership of 
political parties could have on the power structure, which is cur-
rently tilted against young people, will outweigh the temporary 
imbalance of institutionally designated decision-making power; i.e. 
enabling young people to gain a more equal level of political power 
will do more for substantive equality, and furthering their substan-
tive interests, than the size of the harm to (formal) equality of pri-
oritising one group over another in the selection of representatives.
Policy II: incentives and free membership
For the costs of descriptive representation to be outweighed in the 
case of trade unions, the policy to be pursued must therefore be 
one that produces less democratic harm than quotas. One such 
method could be to improve the incentives for young people to 
become members of political parties and trade unions. This would 
not directly harm the democratic process in the way that quotas 
would, because it would not impose a legal requirement that a 
particular group be represented in a certain fixed proportion. 
It could still be complained that such incentives would distort the 
democratic process. I accept this – the point is that it would not 
contravene it. The democratic costs of such a distortion would of 
course be proportional to the size of the distortion itself: they would 
be much greater if every young person was offered money for be-
coming a member than if her membership fee were merely less than 
the usual membership fee. Thus, an incentive system need cause 
only quite minor democracy-distorting effects; and these effects 
would entail costs that were sufficiently small to be outweighed by 
the democratic benefits of descriptive representation. An incentive 
system, moreover, would, unlike quotas, be perfectly applicable to 
the membership of political parties and trade unions.
Let me conclude by offering some trade-union-policy suggestions 
that would meet this incentives criterion. One, as mentioned, 
would be for trade unions to charge a lower membership fee to 
young people (say, those aged between 18 and 30). A reduction 
of somewhere between 25 and 50% would seem reasonable: since 
membership fees are usually not very expensive anyway, even a 
50% reduction would not amount to that much in real terms.
Another suggestion would be for trade unions to offer certain 
benefits to young members that are not offered (or that are offered 
at a fee, or at least a higher fee) to other members. These could be 
benefits such as a free gym membership, but the democratic case 
for descriptive representation would be stronger if such benefits 
directly helped the democratic representation of the young. For 
example, the young could be offered free (or fee-reduced) plac-
es on public speaking or debating workshops, thus incentivising 
them not only to join the party/trade union but also to learn the 
very skills that will aid their representative abilities.
Finally, a method to boost the membership of young people that 
would incur even less democratic cost would be for trade unions 
to spend more money (though not an absurd amount more) on 
publicity and advertising that targeted young people than on pub-
licity that targeted other respective groups. The democratic cost 
here would be especially low because the trade unions would not 
even be offering an incentive to join that other groups were not 
being offered; rather, this policy would largely just have the result 
that a higher percentage of young people were made aware of the 
possibility and benefits of joining a political party or trade union. 
Since they may well be less aware of these than are older genera-
tions, in whose youth the joining of a political party and/or trade 
union was more common and therefore more talked about, such 
a campaign may in fact serve only to correct the present inequality 
in knowledge between the young and older generations.
Of course, these are just suggestions – and rough sketches of sug-
gestions at that – and there are undoubtedly many more ways in 
which young people could be encouraged to join trade unions 
that would have only minimal democratic costs. These ideas could 
also potentially be combined: for example, young people could be 
Enabling young people to gain a more equal level of 
political power will do more for substantive equality, and 
furthering their substantive interests, than the size of 
the harm to (formal) equality of prioritising one group 
over another in the selection of representatives.
One such method could be to improve the incentives for 
young people to become members of political parties 
and trade unions.
Publicity and advertising that targeted young people…
would largely just have the result that a higher percent-
age of young people were made aware of the possibility 
and benefits of joining a political party or trade union.
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offered particular membership benefits that are then advertised 
in a campaign to which a higher-than-average level of funding is 
allocated (higher, that is, than the average level of funding spent 
on advertising to other, equivalent-sized, age cohorts).
What about raising the membership of young people in political 
parties, for which (if they were possible) I have argued that quo-
tas would be democratically appropriate? Because membership 
of political parties is freely chosen, there could be no equivalent 
of quotas that mandated that a certain number of young people 
joined political parties. Instead, then, I would suggest two things. 
First, the above (incentives), but done to a considerably greater 
degree – i.e. stronger incentives. Second, a more radical policy 
proposal could be to randomly select a number of young people 
(from various demographics) every few years, and offer them free 
membership and various benefits for remaining within the polit-
ical party and engaging with its decisions. The number of young 
people to whom these benefits would be offered could, account-
ing for the percentage who will decline the offer, then accord with 
a target number that resembled a quota. To reduce its democratic 
costs, the size of such a “quota” (as happens with quotas generally) 
should be based on a lower percentage than the percentage in 
which those young people make up the population, but, obviously, 
a significantly higher percentage than the one in which they 
 currently make up the membership of political parties.
In conclusion, a dependent conception of democracy clearly shows 
that the under-representation of the young in political parties, 
and to a very limited extent in trade unions, poses a democratic 
problem. In the case of political parties, strong incentives and the 
bestowal of free membership, with benefits, upon a target num-
ber of young people in a way that resembles a quota, would be 
an effective way to remedy this democratic problem, by boosting 
descriptive representation. And in the case of trade unions, the 
under-representation of the young does not pose a democratic 
problem severe enough to justify the use of quotas (even if this 
were possible), but the use of incentives to boost trade union 
membership among young people would produce only minor 
 democracy-distorting costs.
A sound case can therefore be made for raising the membership of 
young people in political parties, and (though to a weaker  extent – 
meriting a correspondingly weaker medicine) trade unions, through 
descriptive representation, in order to further substantive equality 
and substantive interests – the requirements of demo cracy. In this 
final section, I hope I have brought this conclusion to life by giving 
practical examples of methods that would do just this.
Notes
1 E.g. for an analysis revealing this result in Germany, see Fitzen-
berger et al. (2009: 149). For Britain, see Blanden/Machin (2003: 
392f.). For a study across many countries demonstrating particu-
larly low union membership among the young (albeit alongside 
the additional claim that the oldest in society also have low mem-
bership) see Blanchfower (2007).
2 See also, for a similar distinction, Kolodny (2014: 197f.). 
Kolodny refers to a “formal” and an “informal” conception of 
democracy.
3 This is the final “justification” of democracy that Kolodny 
(2014: 199-202) gives: its ability to further people’s substantive 
interests.
4 For the classic treatment of this subject, see Pitkin (1967: ch. 4).
5 I assume here for simplicity that there is no such “competition” 
for group representation, and that the case for representing young 
people can therefore be evaluated on its own merits.
6 For a similar proposal, see Urbinati (2006: 45). See also Urbi-
nati (2000).
7 For one of the few, see Burnheim (1985).
8 For the comment on lunatics, see Griffiths/Wollheim (1960: 
190).
9 For an excellent and insightful discussion of this issue, see Mans-
bridge (1999: 637-639). See also Phillips (1995: 52-56; 1999: 40f.).
10 For a concise and simple overview of the main issues facing 
young people today, see Intergenerational Foundation (2017).
11 For an argument as to why low electoral turnout among the 
young is of significant democratic concern, and how to remedy it, 
see Tozer (2017: 18f.).
12 For example, a “democratic audit” found the Conservative Par-
ty’s policy agenda to be less responsive to its members than the 
Labour Party’s, which in turn was less responsive than the Liberal 
Democrats’ (Democratic Audit UK 2013).
13 Generally speaking, a strong case can be made for quotas in the 
case of representation in the democratic assembly. For such a case 
applied to young people, see Bidadanure (2015).
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